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Introduction
Many of the outstanding examples of propositional tautologies (contradictions) used in proving lower bounds for propositional proof (refutation) systems are derived in a uniform fashion from first-order (fo) principles. For refutation systems, one takes an fo sentence φ without finite models and derives a sequence of propositional contradictions the nth of which asserts that φ has a model of size n. The Pigeonhole principle (PHP) and Least number principle are perhaps the most popular fo principles in this area. The (negation of the) PHP asserts that there is an injection from a set of size n to a set of size n − 1, and the (negation of the) LNP asserts that a strict partial order has no minimal element. Thus neither of these fo sentences has a finite model (though each has an infinite model).
A fairly recent sub-branch of Proof Complexity involves the studying of gap phenomena within propositional proof (refutation) systems. The first such result of this kind appeared in [1] , where it was noted that the sequence of propositional contradictions derived from an fo sentence φ without finite modelsas described above -either has 1.) a polynomially-sized refutation in tree-like Resolution, or 2.) requires fully exponential tree-like Resolution refutations. Moreover, the hard Case 2 prevails exactly when φ has some (infinite) model. Since the publication of [1] , another gap has been discovered based on rank, and not size, for the integer linear programming-based refutation systems of Lovász-Schrijver and Sherali-Adams [2] . In these cases, the separating criterion is again whether or not an infinite model exists for φ, with the hard case -of polynomial instead of constant rank -prevailing if it does.
A gap for Resolution, if it exists at all, can not form along the the same lines. It is known that the LNP -which clearly has infinite models -has polynomiallysized refutations in Resolution (while the PHP requires exponential refutations). Further, it has been argued that Resolution is not so suitable a system in which to search for a gap, because of its instability with respect to relativisation. When one considers certain relativisations of the LNP, the ensuing principles become hard for Resolution -requiring exponential-sized refutations [3] . Model-theoretically, the LNP and its relativisations are very similar, whence the argument that looking for a model-theoretic separation in the case of Resolution might be difficult. Perhaps a more robust system in which to search for a separation might be Resolution-with-bounded-conjunction, Res(k), introduced by Krajíĉek in [4] -for any relativisation of the LNP there exists a k such that it admits polynomially-sized Res(k) refutations [3] .
In this paper we explore the boundary of tractability -polynomially-sized refutations -in the systems Res(k). We prove that any fo sentence with no finite models that admits a Σ 1 interpretation of the LNP, relativised to a set that is quantifier-free (qf) definable, generates a sequence of propositional contradictions that have polynomially-sized refutations in the system Res(k), for some k. When one considers the LNP with total order we demonstrate that a Π 1 interpretation of this is sufficient to allow polynomially-sized refutations in Res(k), for some k. On the other hand, we prove that a very simple fo sentence that admits a Π 1 interpretation of the LNP (with partial and not total order) -and without relativisation -requires exponentially-sized refutations in Resolution. This fo sentence is exactly a Π 1 -variant of the LNP. We conjecture that this same fo sentence requires exponentially-sized refutation in Res(k), for all k. We briefly explore a sequence of Π d+1 -variants of the LNP, and conjecture that they (in fact their negations) may be used to separate depth
The paper is organised as follows. After the preliminaries, we give in Section 3 our upper bounds for Res(k). In Section 4 we give our lower bound for Resolution. Finally, in Section 5 we give some final remarks as well as our conjectures.
An extended abstract of this paper appeared as [5] .
Preliminaries

Resolution and Res(k).
We denote by and ⊥ the Boolean values "true" and "false", respectively. A literal is either a propositional variable or a negated variable. We shall denote literals by small letters, usually ls.
or ⊥. We shall use capital letters to denote terms or k-terms, usually Cs for conjunctions and Ds for disjunctions. A k-DNF or k-clause (k-CNF ) is a disjunction (conjunction) of an unbounded number of k-conjunctions (k-disjunctions). We shall use calligraphic capital letters to denote k-CNFs or k-DNFs, usually Cs for CNFs and Ds for DNFs. Sometimes, when clear from the context, we will say "clause" instead of "k-clause", even though, formally speaking, a clause is a 1-clause.
We can now describe the propositional refutation system Res(k), first introduced by Krajíĉek [6] . It is used to refute (i.e. to prove inconsistency) of a given set of k-clauses by deriving the empty clause from the initial clauses. There are four derivation rules:
(1) The ∧-introduction rule is
The two weakening rules are
A Res(k)-proof can be considered as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), whose sources are the initial clauses, called also axioms, and whose only sink is the empty clause. We shall define the size of a proof to be the number of the internal nodes of the graph, i.e. the number of applications of a derivation rule, thus ignoring the size of the individual k-clauses in the refutation.
In principle the k from "Res(k)" could depend on n -an important special case is Res (log n). In the present paper, however, we shall be concerned only with Res (k) for some constant k.
Clearly, Res (1) is (ordinary) Resolution, working on 1-clauses, and using only the cut rule, which becomes the usual resolution rule, and the first weakening rule.
Equivalence between Res (k) and a special class of branching programs.
If we turn a Res (k) refutation of a given set of k-clauses D upside-down, i.e. reverse the edges of the underlying graph and negate the k-clauses on the vertices, we get a special kind of restricted branching k-program. The restrictions are as follows.
Each vertex is labelled by a k-CNF which partially represents the information that can be obtained along any path from the source to the vertex (this is a record in the parlance of [7] ). Obviously, the (only) source is labelled with the constant . There are two kinds of queries, which can be made by a vertex:
(1) Querying a new k-disjunction, and branching on the answer, which can be depicted as follows.
4 (2) Querying a known k-disjunction, and splitting it according to the answer:
There are two ways of forgetting information,
the point being that forgetting allows us to equate the information obtained along two different branches and thus to merge them into a single new vertex. A sink of the branching k-program must be labelled with the negation of a k-clause from D. Thus the branching k-program is supposed by default to solve the Search problem for D: given an assignment of the variables, find a clause which is falsified under this assignment.
The equivalence between a Res (k) refutation of D and a branching k-program of the kind above is obvious. Naturally, if we allow querying single variables only, we get branching 1-programs -decision DAGs -that correspond to Resolution. If we do not allow the forgetting of information, we will not be able to merge distinct branches, so what we get is a class of decision trees that correspond precisely to the tree-like version of these refutation systems.
Finally, we mention that the queries of the form (1) and (2) as well as forgetrules of the form (3) give rise to a Prover-Adversary game (see [7] where this game was introduced for Resolution). In short, Adversary claims that D is satisfiable, and Prover tries to expose him. Prover always wins if her strategy is kept as a branching program of the form we have just explained, whilst a good (randomised) Adversary's strategy would show a lower bound on the branching program, and thus on any Res (k) refutation of D.
Translation of fo sentences into propositional CNF formulae.
We shall use the relational language of first-order logic with equality, but without function symbols (this is for convenience only -note that one may simulate constants with added outermost existentially quantified variables).
For the sake of explaining the translation, we assume that such an fo sentence φ is given in prenex normal form with quantifier-free part in r-CNF for some r. We start with the easy case of Π 1 sentences:
where F is quantifier-free, and thus can be considered as a propositional formula over propositional variables of two different kinds:
where R is a p-ary relation symbol, and (x i = x j ). We now take the union of the clauses of F as
. . n} as a finite universe). The variables of the form (x i = x j ) evaluate to either true or false, and we are left with variables of the form R x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . x ip only. The general case, a Π l sentence φ,
can be reduced to the previous case by Skolemisation. We introduce Skolem
. . x i , y i ) witnesses y i for any given x 1 , x 2 , . . . x i , so we need to add clauses stating that such a witness always exists, i.e.
The original sentence can then be transformed into the following purely universal sentence
We shall call the clauses (4) "big" (or Skolem) clauses, and the clauses that result in the translation (5) "small" clauses in order to emphasise the fact that the former contain n literals while the latter contain only a constant number of literals, independent from n. Indeed, since F is assumed to be an r-CNF, we can see the small clauses have width l + r -note the equivalence of (
For the given fo sentence φ, we denote its CNF propositional translation obtained as explained above by C φ,n where n is the size of the (finite) model.
Given a (propositional) variable of the form
. . . , x p , y), we call x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x p arguments of R i or S j . We call y the witness of S i . We also call x 1 , x 2 , . . . x p and y the elements of R i or S j .
Finally, we point out that the Skolemisation also gives us a transformation of the original Π k sentence φ into a Π 2 sentence φ :
Clearly φ is equivalent to φ, i.e. φ has the same set of countable models as φ except for the Skolem relations
Whenever we say that we refute an fo sentence φ in Res (k), we really mean that we first translate the sentence into a set of (1-)clauses, assuming a finite universe of size n, C φ,n , and then refute C φ,n with Res(k). Naturally, the size of the refutation is then a function in n.
Least Number Principles
The least number principle is the assertion that every finite partial order has a minimal element. We will consider two versions of it (more accurately, its negation):
the latter of which enforces that the order is total. The translation of these to propositional contradictions is a little verbose, involving as it does the introduction of an essentially unnecessary Skolem relation. We will therefore prefer the slightly more natural versions as follows (note that our results go through for the more verbose versions). Recall the variables are R(i, j), i, j ∈
[n]; for LNP n we have the clauses:
and for TLNP n we add the clauses R(i, j) ∨ R(j, i) for i = j.
Short refutations in Res(k)
In this section we explore upper bounds in the systems Res(k). It is well-known that the Least number principle has polynomially-sized Resolution refutations. We will now consider these as branching 1-programs. Essentially, one maintains at each point a current minimal element m among the investigated {1, . . . , j}, for m ∈ [j]. For the LNP n , we consider major nodes, boxed below, of the program to be of the form
For pedagogical reasons (relating to the forthcoming proof of Proposition 1) we will query negated variables ¬R(x, y). The branching program begins:
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The branching 1-program ends with ¬R(1, m) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬R(n, m) which contradict the Skolem clauses. The total number of boxed nodes is bound by n 2 and the internal nodes in navigating between boxed nodes are fewer than, say, 2n. It follows that the program is of size bound by 2n 3 . In the case of the TLNP n we may go about our business in the dual fashion, with boxed nodes of the form
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We say that an fo sentence φ admits a quantifier-free interpretation of the relativised LNP if there exist quantifier-free formulae P(x, y) and Q(x) such that, in all models A of φ, P(x, y) defines a partial order without minimum on the set of tuples given by Q(x) (which is non-empty). We are now ready to state our first result.
Proposition 1 Let φ be an fo sentence with no finite models, but some infinite model, s.t. φ admits a quantifier-free interpretation of the relativised LNP. Then there exists k s.t. the sequence C φ,n has polynomially-sized Res(k) refutations.
PROOF. In the following, suppose x and y are l-tuples. Let Q(x) be realised as some
s (x) and let ¬R(x, y) := ¬P(x, y) ∨ ¬Q(x) ∨ ¬Q(y) be realised as some
In a branching k-program, when we talk of questioning Q(x) and ¬R(x, y) we in fact mean that we ask the sequence of questions D , y) , obtaining either that they are all true or that one of them is false. This means the branching factor at such a node will in fact be s + 1 and t + 1, instead of 2, corresponding to which of the k-disjuncts might be false (for the sake of simplicity, in future digrams, we will not draw these additional s − 1 and t − 1 branches). When ¬R(x, y) is answered false, we assume that Q(x),Q(y) and P(x, y) are immediately asked and answered true. ¬R(j + 1, m)?
¬R(m, j + 1)?
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The k-program ends with Q(m) ∧ ¬R(1, m) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬R(n l , m) , which yield
which contradict C φ,n . The total number of boxed nodes is bound by n 2l . The internal nodes in navigating between boxed nodes are fewer than, say, 2(t + 1)n l . And right at the beginning there is a branching of (s + 1)n l . It follows that the program is of size bound by 2(s + 1)(t + 1)n 3l .
We say that an fo sentence φ admits a Σ 1 interpretation of the relativised LNP if there exist quantifier-free formulae P(z, x, y) and Q(x), where x, y are l-tuples and z is an l -tuple, such that, in all models A of φ, ∃z P(z, x, y) defines a partial order without minimum on the set of tuples given by Q(x) (which is non-empty).
Proposition 2 Let φ be an fo sentence with no finite models, but some infinite model, s.t. φ admits a Σ 1 interpretation of the relativised LNP. Then there exists k s.t. the sequence C φ,n has polynomially-sized Res(k) refutations. We say that an fo sentence φ admits a Π 1 interpretation of the relativised TLNP if there exist quantifier-free formulae P(z, x, y) and Q(x), where x, y are l-tuples and z is an l -tuple, such that, in all models A of φ, ∀z P(z, x, y) defines a total order without minimum on the set of tuples given by Q(x) (which is non-empty).
Proposition 3 Let φ be an fo sentence with no finite models, but some infinite model, s.t. φ admits a Π 1 interpretation of the relativised TLNP. Then there exists k s.t. the sequence C φ,n has polynomially-sized Res(k) refutations.
PROOF. The proof is similar to the one just given, except we use the dual method for refuting the TLNP.
Exponential refutations in Resolution
In this section we will prove an exponential lower bound on a variant of the LNP in Resolution; a result that is somehow a counterpoint to those of the previous section. A similar result for a relativised version of the LNP has appeared in [3] . Our variant, which is not relativised, will be designated the Π 1 -LNP. It will be specified by the conjunction of the following
∀x∃y (∀uR(u, y, x)), and which more naturally appear as
It is transparent that this admits a Π 1 interpretation of the LNP (with partial and not total order) and no relativisation. We will translate this slightly differently from our stated procedure, with the addition of only a single Skolem relation S(x, y) (this is in order to maintain some simplicity, our argument would work equally well in the normal circumstance).
∀x∃y S(x, y).
We can now give these naturally as the clauses
for each x ∈ [n] u∈[n] S(x, y).
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The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 4 Any Resolution refutation of Π 1 -LNP n must be of size ≥ 2 n 64 .
This will follow immediately from Lemma 10, below. We will derive our result through the probabilistic method, as appears, e.g., in [7] . Considering a decision DAG for the Π 1 -LNP, we first prove that certain large records (conjunctions of facts) must appear. We then prove that a large -exponentialnumber of distinct large records ("bottlenecks") must appear, because otherwise there is a random restriction that generates a decision DAG for a (smaller) Π 1 -LNP, that itself has no large records (a contradiction).
Let us imagine that n is divisible by four (we may handle the other cases in a similar manner). We will describe the following random restrictions to the Π 1 -LNP. Consider a random partition of our universe into two equal parts A and B, with A again randomly divided into the two equal A 1 and A 2 . Our random restriction will constrain the variables as follows.
• S(x, y) and R(w, y, x) for all w and y ∈ A 1 and x ∈ A 2 .
• ¬S(x, y) and ¬R(w, y, x) for all w and x ∈ A 1 and y ∈ A 2 .
• ¬S(x, y) and ¬R(w, y, x) for all w and x ∈ A, y ∈ B or x ∈ B, y ∈ A.
Finally, we set all of the remaining variables of the form R(w, y, x) [i.e. x, y both in A 1 , A 2 or B], to with probability ).
Further, we describe the pair (x, y) as busy if either R(w, y, x) holds (for some w) or ¬R(w, y, x) holds (for some w).
We will consider an n 2 -modified variant of the Π 1 -LNP n in which there are, for each x, y, at most n 2 distinct w s.t. R(w, y, x) is set to . PROOF. We consider an Adversary strategy for the decision DAG. Adversary keeps in mind a set of comparisons P, each of the form x ≺ y, whose transitive closure TC(P) is a partial order involving ≤ n 2 elements. Initially, P is empty. While Prover asks questions of the form S(x, y), Adversary answers ⊥ if x = y, x ≺ y is in TC(P) or ¬R(w, y, x) is on record; and otherwise, adding y ≺ x to P. If Prover asks questions of the form R(w, y, x), Adversary should answer if y ≺ x is in TC(P), and ⊥ otherwise.
If S(x, y) is forgotten then y ≺ x should be removed from P, unless some R(w, y, x) or ¬S(x, y ) for more than n 2 distinct y , or ¬R(w y , y , x) for more than n 2 distinct y , is on record. If ¬S(x, y) is forgotten and there are now < n 2 distinct y s.t. ¬S(x, y ) is on record, then, if there is z with z ≺ x in P, this should be removed unless S(x, z), some R(w, z, x), or ¬R(w y , y , x) for more than n 2 distinct y , is on record.
If R(w, y, x) is forgotten then y ≺ x should be removed from P, unless S(x, y), some other R(w , y, x) or ¬S(x, y ) for more than n 2 distinct y , or ¬R(w y , y , x) for more than n 2 distinct y , is on record. If ¬R(w, y, x) is forgotten and there are now < n 2 elements y s.t. ¬R(w y , y , x) is on record, then, if there is z with z ≺ x in P, this should be removed unless some other R(w , z, x), S(x, y) or ¬S(x, y ), for more than n 2 distinct y , is on record.
The Adversary strategy clearly does not fail until TC(P) has more than n 2 elements, which can not happen unless P contains at least Consider a set of clauses Γ obtained from Π 1 -LNP n by imposing the random restrictions. We describe Γ as good if, for all x, y, both of which are in either of A 1 , A 2 or B, there are ≤ n 2 distinct w s.t. R(w, y, x) is set (to ). If Γ is not good it is bad. Lemma 6 The probability that Γ is bad is ≤ PROOF. We use the following version of the Chernoff bound as appears in [8] . Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . X n be independent 0−1 random variables with Pr [
. Then, for every δ, 0 < δ ≤ 1, the following bound holds
In our case we have p i = 1 4
(and thus µ = n 4
) and δ = 1, so the probability for a specific pair (x, y) to be "bad" is at most e −n 12 . The probability that a bad pair exists is then (by the union-bound on (
2 pairs) at most -modified Π 1 -LNP on either A 1 or B. (It will never contain a refutation of an LNP on A 2 because these elements have other elements below them in the partial order -specifically, those in A 1 . However, we asked for the criterion of goodness on A 2 to ensure against the possibility that, for all x, y ∈ A 2 and for all w, we get both R(w, x, y) and R(w, y, x), which would be an immediate contradiction.) The former may be treated as an instance of an PROOF. Consider each busy entity within the given bottleneck. If x is busy by virtue of S(x, y), then this is falsified with probability ≥ (if x ∈ A, then y ∈ B with probability ≥ ; if x ∈ B, then y ∈ A with probability ≥ 1 2 ). If x is busy by virtue of y∈Y ¬S(x, y), then this is falsified with probability ≥ as this is the likelihood of x being in A 2 while y is in A 1 ). If (x, y) is busy by virtue R(w, y, x) then this is falsified with probability ≥ 1 2
(if x ∈ A, then y ∈ B with probability ≥ ; if x ∈ B, then y ∈ A with probability ≥ 1 2 ). Finally, if (x, y) is busy by virtue of ¬R(w, y, x) then this is falsified with probability ≥ 1 16
(this is the likelihood of x being in A 2 while y is in A 1 ). Now, we do not quite have independence of the busy entities. For, example, if x is busy by virtue of S(x, y) then it is more likely that some (x, y) is busy by virtue of some R(w, y, x); however, these dependencies can only come in pairs. Therefore, we may consider that there are n 16 /2 busy entities whose business is independent. It follows that a bottleneck is falsified by probability exceeding 1 − (1 − max{ PROOF. The probability that a bottleneck survives the random restrictions is ≤ ( ) n 32 . Now, again using the union bound, we deduce that the probability any bottleneck survives or the Γ induced by the random restrictions is bad is at most ( n 2 e −n 12 < 1 (at least for n ≥ 101). It follows that there is some good random restriction that kills all bottlenecks.
Lemma 10 Any decision DAG for Π 1 -LNP n must contain ≥ 2 n 64 bottlenecks.
PROOF.
If not it follows from the Lemma 9 that there is a random restriction that kills all bottlenecks and induces a good Γ. But then what remains incorporates a refutation of this good Γ which has a record involving ≥ n 16 busy entities by Lemma 7. But, such a record would have been a bottleneck in the decision DAG for the original Π 1 -LNP n -a contradiction.
Final remarks
We believe that our proof of Theorem 4 can be canonically extended to prove that the lower bound holds not only in Resolution, but also in Res(k).
Conjecture 11 There exists k > 0 s.t. any Res(k) refutation of Π 1 -LNP n must be of size ≥ 2 k ·n .
We may define the following further variants of the least number principle which we will designate the Π d -LNP. where Q is ∀ if d is odd and is ∃ if d is even. We conjecture that the (negations of the) principles Π d -LNP may be used to separate depth d-Frege from depth d + 1-Frege (for the definitions of these proof systems see [6] ).
Conjecture 12
The negation of the Π d+1 -LNP gives rise to a sequence of propositional tautologies C n that admits polynomially-sized proofs in depth d + 1-Frege but requires exponentially-sized proofs in depth d-Frege.
